And war would have still started.

    Through out the war the Japanese High Command had the ability to create extremely complex operations.  As late as the Battle of Layette Gulf, the Japanese had assembled no less then four independent unit that were, in theory, to work together.

    As Japan's Axis partners took in more and more territory and as the colonial powers were preoccupied else where, Japan began to build a plan that would gather ALL the land she needed at one time.     She already had bases in China, Manchuria, Korea and IndoChina.  She had not attacked the British as her German Allies had ask.  She was involved in diplomatic talks with the United States.  She knew the Americans didn't want to fight again.  They felt they'd done their part in the First World War; the "War to end all Wars."  She felt sure that she could bluff her way through as Hitler had done in Europe.  And if not She had millions of men under arms, (America had about 100,000) and the strongest fleet in the world.  The military planners felt they could make quick work of the Americans.  The Japanese knew our war plans almost as well as we did.  They had admirals that played the American side and given the resources, did their best to "win" at war games.  It was fairly obvious.  Japan would start hostilities by attacking some point that would be a Pacific "Poland" - probably the Philippines. (It would almost have to be the Philippines, because Japan could not allow an American base in it's own back yard while hostilities were under way.  The deliveries of new B-17s with enough range to threaten most of Japan's territories made it a prime target.)   America would send it's fleet out to relieve the garrison at Manila.  A decisive battle would be fought, after which the winning side could dictate peace terms to the loser.

    There were two ways to relieve the Philippines. A quick dash across the Pacific by the Main Battle Fleet, or a slower progression that could take months while building up a defensive corridor.  The latter was favored in the U.S. and the plan was to make sure Bataan could hold out for at least six months.

    But review of these plans began to show that this was impractical.  In her attempt to lead by example, America had lagged far behind in the latest arms race.  Plans were changed to include the withdrawal from the Philippines.  The Japanese could see this and also knew that America would probably sue for peace if possible.  So Japan began to Plan two different routes.  One based on diplomatic success, the other based upon military might.  The Japanese Army Plan, "Operation One," Included the takeover of a large portion of South East Asia including Java, Rangoon and Singapore. It also included the Neutralization of the Philippines.

   At the same time, one of the Admirals of the Imperial Japanese Navy was working out his own plan -- his name was Yamamoto.  Two separate actions had given him the idea.  After the United States Fleet Exercises of spring 1940, the Pacific Fleet did not return to the West Cost, but rather staid in Hawaii.  This was done purely as a diplomatic threat to the Japanese.  On the other side of the world British "Stringbags" (obsolete torpedo biplanes) attacked the Italian fleet in the harbor of Taranto, and caused  much damage.  Americans were aware of the implication of the Taranto attack, but believed that the difference in water depth (70 to 80 feet in Tananto vs. 30-45 feet in Pearl Harbor.) was enough to make torpedo attack impossible. Yamamoto overcame this and every other problem presented him.  He arranged for intelligence gathering at such wide spread locations as the Panama Canal and Alaska.  Among the sites he was having watched was Pearl Harbor. (This watching many points to confuse the enemy is common.  Before D-Day, the Allies flew twice the number of phony sorties over other beaches as they did over Omaha.)

    "Operation Z" was presented to the General staff on Sep 2, 1941 as an add-on to Operation One. It was not embraced by the Navy Chief Admiral Nagano.  For two months the Navy Argued over the advisability of letting six of their carriers off on such a risky mission.  Finally, Admiral Yamamoto threatened to resign if it were not carried out.  He much preferred to attack the Americans while they were at anchor.

    His Task Force was made up of the aircraft carriers Akagi, Kaga, Soruy, Juikaku, Hiruy and Shokaku; battleships Hiei and Kirishjima; Heavy cruisers Tone and Chikuma; one light cruiser Abjkuma and nine destroyers.  Operational command was assigned to Vice Admiral Nagumo.
As a precaution the operations order required the fleet turn around if they should be discovered Before two days from the day of the attack.  Before sortie the task force's call signs were to be changed with destroyers.  The track the attacking force would use would be well north of the great circle track between Japan and Hawaii -- the shipping rout. "Operation Z" had 300 some aircraft in support. By contrast Formosa had over 400 aircraft for the attack on Luzon and Clark Field.

    Briefly, the plan was this:  On Monday, Dec. 8 (Dec 7 behind the date line.) the Japanese Ambassador would deliver a note to Secretary of State Hull, breaking off diplomatic relations.  This was to be done at Exactly 1:00 Washington time, just after sunrise in Hawaii.  The navy would attack Pearl Harbor minutes later, destroying the majority of the Pacific Flee. (Timing was important, because the Japanese didn't want to stir up American opinion.  They believed if they declared war before the attacks, Americans would be less likely to want to fight and would sue for peace at the correct time.)  Then, as the sun came up over the rest of the Pacific, "Operation 1" would take place.  The airfields in the philippines would be attacked;  landings would be maid at various places around the Pacific rim and after they were secure, Washington would come to it's senses and negotiate peace. So the plan was to happen.

    And so it almost did...